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The Alternate Space Shuttle Concepts Study
extension midterm results reported herein »vie
generated jointly by the Grumman Aerospace
Corporation, the Boeing Company, and their as-
sociates. To assure consistency of results, Grum-
man and Boeing worked together ctosely.p^nic-
nbrry in the areas of costing and concept evaluation/
comparison. In general. Grumman concentrated on
overall study management, orbiter/extemal tank
design, and development test pbncing. Boeing
concentrated on the design of both interim and
fully reusable booster configurations as well as
pound operations and maintenance planning.
The other team associates and then* major areas
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Under the four month extension to its Alter-
nate Space Shuttle Concepts (ASSC) Study, the
Grumman/Boeing Team with associates lias investi-
gated potentially cost-attractive programmatic and
technical alternatives to the 1 July baseline (concur-
rent development of an orbiter with external hydro-
gen tanks and booster, both fully reusable). These
alternatives include a phased approach, involving
orbiter development and operation with an expend-
able booster for an interim period, as well as design
variations to the basic vehicles. This report sum*
mzrizcs the study effort and conclusion* achieved
at the mid term (two month) milestone.
Specific study issues were addiessed in terms
of the following tasks, cited in the Contract Exten-
sion Study Plan of 7 July:
1. To accomplish conceptual designs of the
alternate configurations and define the
piuseu (jeveiopnicnt programs tor these
alternate configurations
2. To obtain an understanding of the tech-
nological, operations, cost, and schedule
characteristics of each phased develop-
ment program alternate and to perform
comparative analyses among them
3. To determine the technical and program
- impact of orbiter payload size and weight
and of payload size and weight growth in
conjunction with the program growth
from an interim expendable to reusable
booster
4. To determine the implications of intact
"glide/cruise" recovery capability vs
abort-to-orbit, using the c:;tcrrjl hydro-
gen-oxygen tank single engine orbiter








• f ,-» ~ • , . • : - .• • i ;• :• /•
•»,-'•'-•'! '; )i '*- ^/.iU"'-*•-:?•>'










^• ; . -- *
STUDY OBJECTIVE
I
Define Doable & Affordable Shank Program
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The current contract extension to the Alternate
Space Shuttle Concepts (ASSC) Study addresses the
external hydiogen and oxygen tank (HO) orbiter vari-
ation to the baseline (H) orbiter, used with expend-
able interim bunch vehicles (SIC and SRM's) ultima-
tely leading to fully reusable booster operation. Varia-
tions in paylosd bay length and abort requirements
were also considered.
In addition, we studied a variety of alternative
system configurations with expendable boosters which
were directed towaid a cost per flight reduction and
extended interim operation. Finally, a fully reusable
system using existing engines, F-l and J2» was ex-
plored.
AH options have been developed to a level which
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1. Can we reduce costs if we change
Orbiter requirements?
2. Which is "best'interim Booster for
phased program?
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Threc major areas liavc been assessed in terms of
their influence on shuttle peak annual funding, pro-
gram cost, and cost per flight.
« Influence of Orbitei Design Requirements —
This category has included investigation of:
- H vs HO external tank configurations
— Payload bay diameter, length, and growth
from 40 to 60 feet in length
v
 i .
~ Abort-lo-Orbit (AO) capability vs. No-
Abort-to-Oibit (NAO>
• Use of Interim Launch Vehicles - Three dif-
fc.cnt classes of interim boosteu have been
evaluated:
- Solid rocket motors: 120 in and 156 in.
diameter
Pressure fed liquid rocket boosters using




b >th the H and HO con-
• Re-examination of the Approach to Orbiter/
Booster Development - Both schedule tnodi-
• fications and all- Tnale vehicle approaches
have been considered as follows:
— Schedule revisions including the deferring
of production vehicles and delay of FMOF
- Use of Saluin technology (J2 Orbiter/
F-1-LO2/RP booster) in conjunction with
Block I/Block 11 phasing
— Limited capability approaches including
use of low-cost subsystems and the appli-
cation of an NAO 15x40 orbiter confip-

















Bi^HWfeii^^^^^feiil^^-'-|pl^ f&H-:'" •=' ^ splsr^^M f^ePpteV-
'*^f:;tn:?>.%^-*•"• *'••«• ' ••••/':fe2 ; 'j^»' ;-', / ^ ':v--^^'^*i-^_J'>»7 --^;-:.
..1jJ>.'--.J-'* i - -t-s- ' - -. :-.'J: .
 ;. .•.,*„ 1..', •'.. '."' .. - '_, .'^ .,:.'.\.Jt' ..'•iTrT-S3«, - ::.,l'"t _
Change to oibiter design requirements wthc:i
have a significant impact on vehicle ske am! jyMon
development cost offer potential cost savings of up it
S IB in DDT&K. In uidet to establish which change*
are both feasible and worthwhile, we have Mudied
vaiiatkim in those majoi otbitei systems which haw
stgttifuant si/e and Jevefaptnent cost impact. U.,





1. Can we reduce costs If we change
Orb/ter requirements?
• HvsHO
• Paytoad length & dia.
• Growth
• AOwNAO
2. Which *"best'interim Booster for
phased program?






Potential orbiter requirement changes are ex-
pressed in terms of the six issues shown. Fur each
item, alternative configurations were developed with
identical characteristics, except Tor the feature at is-
sue, and then compared in terms of design and opera-
tional problems, weight, risk, flexibility,and cosi. Of
these criteria, only those identifying relevant differen-
ces are presented for each study.
The first study compared an HO with an H
orbiler, each carrying 65K payload in a 15 x 60 foot
bay. All others usrd HO or biters with 45K payload
except for the growth study, in whkh the fin J design
carried 6SK.
16
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CAN WE REDUCE COSTS IF WE CHANGE
ORBITER REQUIREMENTS?
. Only Hydrogen External, or Oxygen Too?
• Small Payload Diameter, or Large?
Short Payload Bay. or Long?
. can We Start With Short Payload Bay &GroW?
17
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The issues that were conadeied in the H vs HO
comparison included the following:
• Oibiter configuration
• External tank configuration
• Qualitative structural/dynamic trends
for the orbitei with expendable tanks
• Mated vehicle configuration
• Heat sink booster weight and perfor-
mance
• Ability of the orbiter to compensate
for inert weight growth by growing the
main propellant tanks
• Propulsion subsystem and separation
system comparison
• External tank and interstage disposal
o Orbiter DDT&E. peak annual funding and
cost/flight comparison
• Orbiter core vehicle aerodynamic balance
IB
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H vs HO ISSUES
• Tank/Orbitcr Struct. & Dynamics
o Heat Sink Booster Weight & Performance









The baseline H 15x60 orbiter, which was
used for the II vs HO oibiter comparison, incorpo-
rated the following improvements over the 1133
orbiter design documented in the Gruniman/Boeing
Alternate Space Shuttle Concepts Study final re-
poit:
• The aiibreathing engine system (ABES)
installation was relocated lo the aft end
of the payload bay resulting in reduced
scar weight and increased available fuse-
lage volume
• Main non-integral LO2 tanks extended
aft into the area vacated by the ABES
reducing the tank diameter and thereby
decreasing body cross-sectional area and
body wetted surface area
• Relocation of the docking interface
from the payload bay to the nose short-
ened the vehicle by 40 in.
The usable main injection propellant is
780300 Ib resulting in an orbiter ideal A V of
18383 fps. The orbiter T/W at staging is 1.26.
2O
H 15 x 60










The dominant problem in configuring the HO
15x60 vehicle is to keep the excursion of the
bnded eg, with and without payload, within limits
acceptable for aerodynamic balance. To minimize
this excursion, the main engines with fixed noz-
zles, are located as far forward as possible with ; '
their fuel inlets running under the payload: The
OMS oxidizcr tanks can then be mounted above
the main engines, close to the OMS engines. An
alternative engine pattern, locating the engines
in the same forward position but radially around
the payload ccntcrline in an inverse triangle pat-
tern, reduces the width of the base but the ad-
ditional exposed wing results in a weight penalty.
The base areas are about the same for both en-
gine patterns.
The four-man cabin shows a forward dock-
ing system which necessitates a swing-away nose.
Protection of the upper fusebge by the
chines during reentry down to a = 25° dictates.
to a great extent, the plan view shape of the for-
ward fuselage.
The usable main injection propellant is
735^00 Ib resulting in an orbiter ideal A V of
18383 fps. The oibiter TAV at staging is 1.26 to




HO 15 x 60
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A dry weight comparison of the H vs HO, with
15x60 pjykrad bays, shows that the HO cote vehicle
diy weight is 24% less than that of the H core vehicle.
The H oibiter non-integral main propulsion oxygen
tanks, which weigh 11,500 to. are inctuded in the
45,372 Ib dry weight difference.
;• The body volume of the H and HO core vehi-
cles are 51,500 ft3 and 34,000 ft1, respectively.
This represents a 34% reduction in body volume
for HO over H.
A breakdown of the difference in the H and
HO tank dry weights is shown on the next chart.
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H vs HO WEIGHTS
(15x60)
HO Core Dry Weight A -45,372 Lb
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A configuration and weight comparison of the
H arbiter's two 15-foot diameter external LH2 tanks
and the HO orbiter single 22-foot diameter external
Uli/LO^ tank illustrates the lower weight and
simpler structural arrangement of the external LH> tanks.
The major items in the MO tank that contribute to the
dry weight difference of 26314 Ib are the structural and
propulsion feed system weights for the LO7 tank, the
increased structural weight of the LH-, tank (because
it is a load carrying structure) and the increased inter-
weights due to the mid and aft skirts. Both H
and HO tanks have a 5% dry weight growth allowance.
',t-
The mass fraction of the H tanks and the HO
tank are 0.828 and 0.9264. respectively. The mass
fraction b defined as the weight of usable propeDant
divided by the sum of the usable propelbnt and the
inert weight of the tank. ;
A sketch of three SI VB stages is shovm along-
side the HO tank to illustrate the size of the HO tar'..
28
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FRACTURE CONTROL (LOX TANK)
The external HO tank has the obvious advantage
of single use and the resulting benefits such as:
• Minimum fatigue damage, flaw growth, :nd
stress corrosion aacking
• Use of minimum factors of safety hi design
of both LH2 and l^ tanks
• Accessibility during manufacture. NDE,
test and service.
TANK COMPLEXITY
The external H lank is less complex than
the UO tank as i: docs not require tank interstage
structure or booster attachment structure. The HO




The HO configuration is preferred due to the
simpler tandem separation of the booster and
orbiter over the piggy-back H type of separation. In
addition, the HO tank separation procedures and
mechanization b simpler due to the single tank.
ORBITER POGO
In comparing the length of the LOX fines
between the H and HO configuration, the HO line
is appreciably longer (approximately 85 feet com-
pared to 23 feet). From prior analysis of the H
configuration, no POGO problem was evident; how-
ever the longer HO line will tend to increase sensi-
vity of this configuration POGO.
/
ALL DYNAMICS, OTHER THAN POGO
The HO configuration, being longer than the
H configuration, is potentially more sensitive to
coupled vehicle dynamics such as "stop sign flutter"










H vs HO QUALITATIVE STRUCTURAL/DYNAMIC











Booster & Taak Separations
Orbiter POGO (LOX Line Length)

















..*•. .A .- Is -^. - *^K-=— — .
The A oibiter is paraDd mounted with attach-
ments straddling the booster LH? tank. The vehicles
are mated horizontally and rolled out to the launch
pad on the booster landing gear.
The HO orbiter is tandem mounted on the
booster nose and is oriented with its vertical fin
opposite to the booster's to avoid impingement of
the orbiter's plume on the booster windshield. The
stack requires vertical mating and roll out.
3O
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Tandem mounting increases the bending moments
on the forward body and the LH^ tank, resulting in ai ~ . i
greater proportion of booster inert weight forward.
This weight shift allows a wing-mounted booster air-
breather installation. Compared to the H booster,
the HO vehicle has heavier nose and LH2 tank





FOR TANDEM MOUNTING (FROM H TO HO)
Ztth.0.
ABES En
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Small differences in HO and H booster weights
illustrate the minor overall effects due to tandem vs
parallel mounting. The slightly higher dry weight
of the HO vehicle is compensated by the lower ascent
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During a nominal mission both II and HO
external tanks are jettisoned following 01 biter in-
sertion into the 51 x 100 n mi ascent transfer or-
bit. Initiation of the tar.:: deorbit maneuver is
timed so that nominal tank impact is targeted for
the baseline impact zone in the Indian Ocean
which is approximately the antipode of ETR.
The HO tank separation maneuver is considered
to be somewhat simpler than II since there is
only a single HO tank to separate as compared to
the two II tanks.
Both the H and HO tanks will breakup in
the upper atmosphere. However, it is expected
that the HO tank breakup will occur at a lower
altitude than the H tanks due to its heavier
structure. A breakup altitude of 240,000 feet
for HO tank results in a maximum down-range
dispersion for tank fragments of 650 n mi as
compared to a breakup altitude of 300,000
feet and a resulting highci maximum down-
range dispersion of about 1200 n mi for the H
t~nk fragments.
The probability of II tank fragments
surviving reentry is low due to the high tcnk
breakup altitude and the low sk> gages of the
structure. There is a higher probability that
some fragments of the HO tank would survive
reentry. The net effect of these tank disposal
issues favors HO.
Interstage disposal is an additional issue
wtikh is unique to the tandem HO configura-
tion. During an interim program, the interstage
can be jettisoned with the expendable booster.
, However, when the launch configuration in-
cludes a reusable booster, then the booster op-
tioosaxe to either jettison the interstage if the
impact zone is acceptable or design an accept-
able scheme of retaining the inteistage with the






H vs HO, TANK & INTERSTAGE DISPOSAL
•Tank Dispersions
- Breakup Altitude
- Fragment Survival Probability












650 H Mi <•
HO TankScparatioo Simpler
Interstage Disposal .
- Jettison with Interim Booster
; .- t.
- Options with Fhs! Sec
o Retain or Jettison
Three major questions arise concerning the
operational aspects of configurations employing ex-
ternal tanks. The fust is the question or tank dis-
posal on missions where the oibiter injects directly
into a high energy orbit, such as 50 by possibly up to
800 n mi. For these missions the nominal 200
fps A used to retro the tanks is insufficient, and
increasing the retro A will also increase tank dis-
persions. A better approach which will still limit
dispersions, is to carry the tanks through the mis-
sion, and jettison them at entry interface. Assum-
ing a 600 n mi orbit, the payload penalty associated
with this approach is 4000 and 7000 Ib for the H
and HO configurations, respectively.
The second question b the compatibility of
tank jettison procedures with missions which are
time critical with rendezvous opera lions occurring
between orbiter burnout and apogee. Since the time
required foi tank venting prior to jettison could
compromise rendezvous, sealing disconnect values
of the type used on the Atlas could be used at the
tank/ o>-i>iter interface, thus reducing or eliminating
the venting time requirements. These valves are of
a proven design and represent small weight and
cost/flight increments.
The third question is related to tank dis-
posal following aborts that occur prior to nominal
booster/orbitcr staging. Assuming that the orbiter
always would bum its propellants to depletion,
the tanks would he jettisoned at a "q" of 10-20
psf in a pressuiacd condition. The estf«:iated






MAJOR EXTERNAL TANK QUESTIONS
QUESTION
1. Tank dispersions for high altitude
missions? COO ami
2. Compatabilrty of tank jettison
operations with timeline-critical
missions?
3. Aborts prior to nominal booster
separation?
1. Dispersions can be kept small
,; by carrying tanks to orbit
'" ' or deorbit- paytoad penalty.
4KH;7KHO ,
2. Reduce jettison operations time
by retaining residuals. Requires
Atlas-type sealing disconnects.
Delta weight & cost/flight
150&&S30K
3. If early separation required,
born orbitcr to depletion. Tanks
Qp ^» ipfli<»norl at 1 (1-20 rwf
"q" tf pressurized. Weight
penalty ~ 500 Ib.
39
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The inherent capability of the H and HO con-
figurations to accommodate unpredicted inert weight
growth beyond the present oibiter growth allowance
was investigated. Two cases were considered, one in
which there is no design allowance for this unprcdicted •
growth and the second where the vehicles were pre-
scaued to accommodate unpredicied inert weight
growth.
Without design allowance for growth, the options
are fairly straightforward. For the II orbiter the only
option was to increase the size of the external LH> tank
and operate the main engines at a lower average mixture
ratio. An avenge mixture ratio of 5.75:1 was chosen
since it provides a ratio of 6:1 at nominal separation
(yielding maximum EPL in the event of engine failure)
which decreases to 53:1 at the end of burn. The
percent inert weight growth allowance for this case
was only 0.7%.
For the MO orbtter. the only option was to add
oxygen to lh<» nose of the external HO tank since it is
not practical to disturb the tank/orbiter interface geometry
ot the tank/booster interface geometry. A mixture
ratio of 6.25:1 was chosen for the growth version for
the same ream; discussed in the previous paragraph.
This yielded a net growth allowance of 2.1% which
40
represents a relatively modest growth allowance, but
certainly a substantial improvement over the II orbiter.
A phis tor HO.
The second case considered pre-scarrcd the II
orbiter by providing additional body volume so that
the diameter of the internal non-integral oxygen tank
could be increased by 4 in. This coupled with a
large external hyjiogen tank would permit an inert
weight growth allowance of S.2ff which would double
the present H orbiter core phis tank growth allowance.
The iterated scat weight penalty to the initial K
rrbiter design was esiiiiiaied lobe 1020 Ib. , . . "
'' The HO orbiter was pie- scar red by increasing
the length of the IK) tank interstage by 4.2 feet which
permits future stretching of both the Ub and LO>
tanks without disturbing the existing wiuctwai interfaces.
This would permit an inert weight growth of 6.6%. f •
which also doubles the present HO orbiter plus tank -'
growth allowance, at a scar weigh: penalty in the initial
design oC 1 4SO Ib. A plus for 1 1, if pre-scariing the
obiter f«v groavih is accepJsb!?. .,-•'*"
Based on this analysis, there is no dear cut ad-
vantage to either H or HO in terms of development
flexibility.
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1. Smaller Lines to Srpaiate - Goth designs require
6-line disconnects. The H orbiter has 2-14 In.main
lines, 2-6 in. vents, and 2*4 in. recircuiatton lines, .
whereas the HO orbiter has a 17 in. Ul^ main lino, a
IS in. L(>2 main line, 2-8 in. vents, and 2-4 in. rcclr-;
rulation lines. The HO orbiter requires that LO-> •: .
disconnects and larger, I H-> disconnects be developed.
2. Less Critical Disconnect Doors - II doors are
located on the fuselage sides (IOOO°F environment)
whereas tlte HO doors are on the bottom (16QQ°F \
enviionment) thus making th? HO design more alii-;'
cat from the standpoint of door design and failure
sensitivity -
3. Smaller Gimbal Angle Travel • Location of the
HO external tuck requires that the HO orbiter haw a /
toti'l jyinhal ar.jlc travel of 25° to maintain adequate
control in ihc event of an atmospheric abort. The
equivalent total gimbal angle travel for the H orbiter
i s 2 0 ° • : . • ' • '-•"";.;.
HO ADVANTAGES "',.•
\. No Propcllant Management - The HO whiter
single main LO7 and L'.K tanks do not require the
allocation of reserve prupcllants to account for non-
simultaneous depletion of patullel tanks, as Is required
for H ofbitcr duul train LO, aivd LI I, Unks. This
tmounts to a 443 Ib propclfsnt saving*. In addition,
the single LH2 feed line traps 57 Ib less propeDant
<• 2. Less Pressurant & Simpler Purge System - The
lower surface to volume ratio of the HO main pro-
pulsion tanks, as compared to the H main propulsion
tanks results in less piessuran* collapse and thus less
"trapped gas. The effect is most pronounced on the
:LO2 side and results in a 180 Ib gas savings. The HO
orbiter purge system musi purge only the feed lines
-'• and not tlte tanks, icsulting in an additional 100 &
 ;
hardware saving
3. Separation is Extension of Saturn Technology •
The HO orbltcr/booMer will use a shaped charge scv-
crancc ^;'thc intmtagc structure,as used in the
Saturn booster. The H concept uses a hydraulically
actuated linkage to push the vehicle* apart
" } : • ' ; :
:• ^ - , '
.
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H vs HO, PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
ADVANTAGES
O
• Smaller LH2 Lines & No L02 Lines
to Separata (Total No. Equal to HO)
• Reclosing Disconnect Openings
ten Critical
• Smaller Gimbal Angle Travel
(±10° vs ± 12.5° for HO) for
Atmospheric Abort
• Simple Feed; No Propeilant
Management (-500 Lb Fluid)
• Less Pre-surant & Simpler Purge
System (-280 Lb)
• Orbitcr/Booster Separation Is
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A comparison of itic II I5xt>0 and the IIO IS
x 60 oibiur costs shows u reduction in the 110 orbiter
core DDT&E of S265M over the II otbitct core, an in*
creased HO tank DDT&E of SI75M over tlic II tank,
with a net total HO orbiter DUT&C reduction of S90M.
It should be noted that although the dry weight
of the HO orbiter core U 24% lower than that of the
H orbitcr core, most of this difference n attributable
to structural subsystem reductions. A large number of
the orbitcr subsystems arc relatively insensitive to
vehicle wright. The structural subsystem related
costs amount to about one quarter of the total orbiter
core DDT&G cost. This is the major contributor to
the S265M HO orbitcr cure saving. The cost/flight
ditu-icncr of S790K between the H and !K> config-
urations is primarily due to the difference in average
production costs between a pair of external H tanks
and an external HO tunk and its interstage.
&
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H vs HO, COST COMPARISON
(ORBITER ONLY) N
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Several HO fuselage design option* art sho*n.
The cost baseline, Column 2, has its thfcs high
pressure engines In a low horizontal tow so that the
required straight sections of propellanl line run under
the paytoad bay. This results in a payload bay closer
to the vehicle center of gravity with an acceptable
eg travel of 2%. A modified cockpit arrangement with
front docking has helped reduce dry weight. The first
column sliowt the vehicle characteristics with a tri-
angular main engine arrangement. Center of gravity
travel of 2.7% is beyond that which can be tolerated
with the current I3.8%elcvons. The remaining CGIV
figuration* use smaller propulsion installations (NAO)
and a tailored payload bay,
T -







































This represent? a tutnniary of the issues div
cussed on the previous pages.
A qualitative analysis of the structural/dynamic
trends for the orbiter and the expendable lank* in-
dicates no clearcut advantage for cither H or HO.
The tandem MO HSU and the piggy-back H
HSU have almost identical weights and performance.
The ability to compensate for inert weight
growth of the orbiier by increasing the siic of the
main propcllant tanks shows an advantage for HO
ii no scar weight is permitted in the initial design
and an advantage for H if a modest initial scar
weight penalty of about 1000 ib can be tolerated.
Therefore, development flexibility is a toss-up.
The HO propulsion subsystem is superior
to the H because of its simpler feed system result*
ing from a single main LJ^ and JLX^ tank.
110 tank disposal is slightly favored over
H tank disposal because tlicrc is only a single tank
to separate and the predicted dowiuangc disper-
sion of the HO tank fragments is about one-half
the predicted dispersion of the H tank fragments.
However, HO tank interstage disposal wiih s re-
usable booster poses a design and/or operation*
complexity.
A cost comparison Indicates a small reduc-
tion in HO otbiicr peak annual funding and DDT&E
costs, but a more substantial increase in cost/flight
duo to the more expensive expendable tank. There
is no obvious winner from the cost vantage point.
t
With its design, operational, and early funding
advantages, the HO configuration warrants further
investigation (in structural/dynamic areas related to
its tandem arrangement) before a final selection is
made.
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H vs HO SUMMARY
ISSUE
• Tink/Oibiter Struct. & Dynamics
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The next six illustration) summarize studies
that were performed to identify the potential bene-
fits of reducing the payload bay size. Otbiter de-
signs with payload dimensions of 15x60,15x40









• Orbiter Dry Weight
• External To.vk Dry Weight
• Orbiter 8. Tank OOTftE
o PAF
HSSS
*f" ft' 11»« HO core dry weights arc compared for the
; 12x40,15x40 and 15x60 vehicles. All three we
i shown lot piyteads of 45K up and 25K down. In
?' addition, a 15x60 vehicle with pay toad capability
•f' of 65K up and 40K down is also shown. Note the
~. • t * • t '-. •
' "knee" in the curve; increasing the payload from
12x40 to 15x40 increases core dry weight by
only 2503 Ib, while increasing from 15x40 to 15x60
••'• * '*. '•' . i- .
, increases core dry weight by 19,955 Ib.
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• The issue of paytoad diameter is addressed by
comparing the I?x40and the ISx40orbiierson
r
 th4 bash of total dry weight (including tanks), body
volume and bod) wetted area. It is concluded that
the total orbiter dry weight savings in reducing the
payload bay diameter from 15 to 12 feet is small.
This small reduction is borne out by the correspond-
































































The effects of payload bay length were expkwod
by comparing the 15x60 and the 15x40 HO oibUti.
It wat found that payload bay length is «icbtivtly
brger driver than payload diameter on body volume
and wetted area, and therefore on dry weight. The
core dry weight reduction In reducing the cargo bay
length by 20 feet is 19,995 Ib.
PAYLOAD BAY LENGTH - 15 x 60 OR 15 x 40
c
o
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fba dry weight reduction* to going fiom 60
to 40 foot paykwt) bey length reflect Into oibitet
and tank development am) pc«k annual funding
reductions of SI44M and S3JM, respectively.
Whether or not thete savings «nould In impicmtnted








• Orbltir dry weight
• Ext tank dry weight
• Ortltcr + UnhOnT&E
• Peak annual fundmg
15X60— * DIM*— 15X40
(45K/25KPLD)V ' (45K/25KPLD)
. • '.,.^ -i^ K- -/;:•..
Acctptablt
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A rfudy wu made of the iropUcattonsofa two
{date of biter program In which the feftU crbitet hat
• payload bay size of 15x40. and is modified later
to a 15x60 payload bay size. The objective of the
study was to define the best approach to growth in
terras of:
• Minimum scat weight to both the initial and
final vehicle
• Minimum rework requirement
The scar penalties ccn«Kfcred were weight, cost, aero-
dynamic performance and risk, and the rework pen-
alties considered weir cost and risk. The results were
evaluated on potential net benefit! in reducing Initial
development and peak annual funding requirements.
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ORBITER GROWTH
(15 *40to 15160)
• (tot Approach to Growth • < '







• Cost • Structure. Engine
-Risk
• Net Benefit of Growth Approach
' ^"Urf-«-V THUMB*
.
owth, 90 opUntod 15x40
orbtttt (shown on the Itft) wa> compared with an op*
tlm)iced,!Sxi6pcabitn (shown on tht right)! Tbteore
Ndthcr vehkle hid been mrred fa growth.
potential apjwoadws to {growth wett then considered.
In thrnnMppr^ ieh (wcond ronflfuratibn from the
bA)2 tht inljial itKicJo wje cnly scanted to the extent
of providing Sfraln engSnctslied for tht final whfcU,"
ptu» thf lt^ Uontof weight through tht tchido to ;
cany thett lirptir cngine«.'7he initial core weight '
savingk wat reduced to 28,000 Ib. : \
v H^ '1> V
,'. * 1*; . •
v ' * - < E . . - . - ' - .
Slnct UMArtwork of thb vehicle to tht final tizt:r
would bo largt, a second and hopefufly tuorc practical':
approach to growth w» studied (third cc<Ulguratlon c
from tht lefl)^  In thb case tlw orWtet scan taduded
tht larger engines plus provisions for a new wing and •:
a 20 foot "slug*? in tht fuselage. These added scan re-
duced tht initial core savings to 6700 to, and further ,
resulted in a 2300 &> scar remaining in tht final 15x60
64
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tg <g*gi0 growth approaches
jr} in development and
c small. In addl- .





' • ' y*
conctu
solution to
tear cost and ,
• • - • • • ' •**••* "*%$*•&
, * "If- -^-^1*^^
: v ;*•• i *.*••* i^Lr-.
; »'.-4r.'&. • •'•*)-
^5f- ;;,•••
? * "
^ y • • , - .
.
M
- • . •reasons it is
i^ is not a practical
;al and pre/post-
ly assessed.




^^^^-^^A^^^^-r^i-^;.^v..- ..• —.^^v.. •.^\--?**?|rtj
-JSJ -• '" ' - : ; ' - ' ^ • • ' - " "' ^i-'"•''-•• %- ¥x£sfctstK





Sen limited to SSME vs
Initial Cost Saving RHativ*

























The NAO v» AO rtwdy Mail* from a definition
of whiter duuactciUtics needed to pcrfonn aboiWo.
orbit. Thcorbitcr mutt achieve a oncc^ound^orbit;,?
with an engine oui from nominal staging wth QMS
propcllant augmentation. In the staging vdodty
(Vrtagp) region of interest, this didaics tlucc oi? vbiter engine* and a minimum T/W at «aA VMage
to provide AOcapabiUty, The study objective*, <r
were to citabUsh whether relaxation of tW&con. v
rtraint provided appreciable cost saving* and whether
NAO wa» operatlbnaliylisiblc. ;,; ''•; ..•_.
!' • : . . - ' • • . ' . •,-. f:* '• • - . ' . -
' ' . . - . ' • • • ' . , • ' • ••• '• ' I '?..C:';:
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NAOvsAO, ISSUES
• Orbiter CissractBrUtics Required For Abort-to-OrbJt With
OM Engim 0«v.
. - Numbar of Cngintj _ •
- T/W
• Potential Weight and Cost Savings for NAO
• NAO Abort Footprint
!&£.
A generic HO, 4SK 15x40 orbiter with 2/3 SSME
wts stze*nd cost-a ended, through a T/W nngc of 0.7
to IJ and Vstage range of 4K to 8K fp», for a 12-
flight interim program using 2-stage 120 in. SUM
boosters. The characteristics of the mininumi cost
three engine AO ate thown. With one less engine, the
NAO is 13K ib lighter in dry weight and 2.IK. Ib
lighter in OLOW than the AO orbitcr. Both vehicle
stage at 7000 Tps to provide hcut sink booster
compatibUity.
For comparison with the two engine design, a
single engine NAO at the unw performance level is
defined. Bec-juxc of its higher specific weight, the
one engine design .suffers a penalty of 2K ib in dry
weight and 7K H> in OLOW. Tlie two-engine NAO
configujsuon was therefure used aa the basis for
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NAO & AO ORBITER CHARACTERISTICS
Core Dry Weight, lb
GLOW. Lb






















Orbittrc HO IS X 40 With 45 K Piyload
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The results of the parametric size-trending to
shown in terms of cote and tank inert weight*.
Characteristically, both core and tank inert weights
grow at an increasing rate as V«tagc drops. Higher
ideal AV and AV losses combine to increase pro*
peQant requirements notvUnearly to as to drive
tank weight and core engine weight up sharply.
At a fixed V,taje, core weight reduces as
thrust drops; tank weight exhibits a reverse trend
below T/W - I JO, reflecting a propellant penalty
based OR higher AV losses,especially »t low V*uage>
However, at higher Vuage. where AV tosses are
less severe, tank weight is relatively independent
ofT/W.
s*s«, , .,;. •<-:*".£!
NAO v» AO. ORBITER & TANK INERT WEIGHT
<>LO\V,»shown, roughly icflcsit the cbwae-
terbUcs of tank rather than cure Inert weight, tince
propeBaot weight, which grow* in unUon »ith unk
weight, i» the inajof contributor to OLOW.
Hie *Miu T/W for ACT line establishes the
AO boundary; its dupe rtflscis the fact that as
V,|agc decreases, AV loues increase and a greater
T/W is required to achieve orbit. Three-engine
vehicles to the right of this line have AO capability.
Note Hat,above 7K fps V,tegj, low T/W (< 0.95)
provides AO capability.
In addition, fixed engine thrust lines aie
shown for two- and three-enp'rte configurations.
The thrust level per engine of 325K S.L. U esti-
mated as the minimum sUe usable in a 12-engine,
7K fps Vstogo booster, matching the orbltcrs
under study. These minimum engine lines thus
define boundaries for orbiters intended for ulti-
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Ifio T/W for AD
With 3 Engine*










_t Ai^ A ,
Total costs for a representative Interim pro-
tram, n shown, reflect the characteristic* of core
inert weight nther than tank weight and GLOW;
core DDTAE $* the major contributor to program
cons rather than propellant and tank hardware
for a 12-flifht program. \ }
Ilicimuro cost AO (three engine) and NAO
(twoengine) designs are indicated, at 7K fps VMage
(to present heat sink booster performance com*
patibility) and at minimum engine size (to preserve
booster SSME commonality). The DOT&B cost
saving of S180M for the NAO Is derived almost
entirely from the deletion of an engine sr.J its
!3K ib dry weight advantage.
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Reentry trajectories wete developed for both
the on* and two-engine NAO orbltcrs, based on one
engine out at • nominal Vnage of 7K fpt. The
tingle-engine vehicle glides; the two-engine vehicle
has powered flight with iU remaining engine at
Emergency flww Level (liRP), and achieves
roughly twfce the down range from separation
•s th*one<ngineorbiter. Comparative footprint!
sre shown foe launches into a 55 deg orbit where
both orbltcn reach CONUS, and a due East launch
where both could reach a portion of the Bahamas.
For a launch azimuth between 45 and 87 deg the
two-engine vehicle can reach Bermuda, whereas
the one engine veidcl* is committed to water im-
pact.
As opposed to the AO orbiter which can return
to its launch site, both NAO vehicles would require





(ONE & TWO ENGINE ORBiTERS)
• At NomiMl Stt|iB| - 7K fpi
• Out Eitfim Out
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In summary, the two-engine NAO b preferable
to one engine on the hash of weight and minimum
bunch azimuth restriction. Compared to the AO.
the iwo-tngine NAO offers a modest weight and
potential cost wing. However, Its cost advantage
will be reduced when the effort to provide oiTsitc
rerovr i y b factored in.
Since thb study was performed on a single
configuration type (HO with SSME and sntsO pay-
load), it is recommended that NAO character-
btics be reassessed for the final shuttle configura-
tion before the AO-NAO decision is made.
80
*> ~ ^X" -,*-JH,-,^.-_-.: .
i
•f
j^lli gj.v:-st i^^^ '^^ «;^ :'^
S«k;:^ A«,>/.^ -;;V?r&.3 ;^^ v^
NAO vs AO SUMMARY
(HO - 15 x 40)
(to. of Engiim
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• NAO OHm$Kw!l Potentid Savings With SSME
1
','1
^- i i 11 11 "* r i fmt T '1*11' ~"*^
As in example of the reduction in DDT&E
available as whiter requiiements are progresu'.tfy
relaxed, four cost-saving options arc shown. Coin-
pwed to the external Ul2 tank baseline (H33).
. *>.T '4.
• Changing to '.lie external LH2 plus LO2 tank
design 0IO 15 x 60) tarn S90M
- • Reducing )>aylrad bay length from 60 to 40
feet iave» an addittonaJ S144U
Reducing the number of engines from three
to two, and relinquishing aborMo-otbit cap-
ability, produces a further reduction of SI80M
Finally, uiing existing J2 engines and de-
ferring SSM E Uevelopment saves another
82
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At a result of the oibiter requiremenU studies,
wt
• The HO orbiter has a higher cost per flight ^
than the II; however, It offeis a reduction jf?
in peak annual funoing, and DDT&E costs, '* '\
and some design and operational advantages
(simpler propulsion system, ami reduced tank
dispersions ufiei jettison). Further technical
and tank cost analysis is required to make a
final determination between the HO and II.
• A 12-foot diameter payload bay saves few -
dollars (S6M in PAF, S19M in DDT&E).
The reduced capability is not worth the '
saving
• A 40-foot long payload bay saves a more
significant amount ($31M in PAP. S144M
In DDT&E) and to worth consWerinilf /'
payload requirements, when fuDy defined.
• Payload bay growth is not attractive when 5
potential interim vehicle cost savings are
weighed against design risk and cost of re-
work " ' - • • ; " " ' . • ' •
ft?
• NAO can provide worthwhile cost $ivU»gi||^
(MOM in PAF, S180M in DDT&E) at sainc^ -;
Vj(agC find engine size as AO. Itewevtr^;: -
operatk.nal restrictions and cost of offsite
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CAN WE REDUCE COSTS IF WE CHANGE
ORBITER REQUIREMENTS?
• Only Hydrogen £gtemalfor Oxygen Too?:
• Saw OOT&E Coil Bat Cost/Flight Higher
• Technical Analysis Incomplete
• . . . ' , ' - .%"• - :
Small Payload Diameter, or Large?
5?«<
• Short Psyload Bay, or L ong?
Sms $; requirements dominate
• Can We Start With Short Payload Bay & Crow?
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INTERIM BOOSTERS













WET AND DRY CRADLE
2. Which is *best'interim Booster for
phased program?
3. How con we reduce ovffrjfl Shuttle
program costs?
87
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CoroperaWe costs were achieved by placing
emphasis in these areas, which were cliuscn not only
for their cost-driving characteristic* but their suscep-
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.The tot program sumiiiaiy for ill candidates
demomtrate* this emphasis on consistency and
clearly shows the developmental status or each
candidate. The more mature status of both the
120 In solids and the S-1C allowed reduction of
their respective test programs.
£->$•'
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The rtdoclion In »lz« and the ollevtaUon or
uiukiiiabk motor characteristics were the prime
factors in the two stage, small diameter SRM evolu-
tion. The 260 in. single motot, single stage exceeded
reasonable size criteria. The 120 and 1 $6 in. motors
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The selected point design tot the 120 to. SKM
.. lequooa • total of stvwi modified T-1J1M solid motors.
' ,Fiwe 1207 motors are clustered in the first stage
while the two second stage motors ju^ strapped on
*(O the otbitet extemal tank. Second stage expansion
ratio H 20:1 compa* ed with a first stape »-atJo of 9:1
ip order to increase performance capahlUty. Re-
gretiivc fim stage burning, used to reduce dynamic
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Technical emphasis was placed on the definition
and cost* of the subsystems required to make a solid
rocket motor into a rocktt it age. Ihfct is a major
cost df ivcr on the unit vehicle price, and comprises
the hardware listed. Of thew elements, clustering ',
structure provides the largest cost impact. In addi-
tion to hardware, a substantial cost goes legate'

















STAGE EQUIPMENT « CLUSTER ABLE
Sttg* Equipment ctnunbit
SRM & Ignite? •*»» COM
• InstrtrmMtitio*
• Tdeimtry Trawroilf w$
• Thrust TcraUratioit Sucks CkOrdnxnc*
n
• Ctotitf AttwhStmct & Separation Meebiwsn
'
• Oettruet Sv«tim . . • _ ' ,
• ExterRal iDuijatton
• Cluaer Attach Struct.
• Att Shirt
• Umbilical
• B^se Heat Shield
• APU & Fuel Handling
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,: _ 7-Th* levised thtiut trace was chosen for the 120
in. SRM tlrtci ose of the existing groin (with less
thrust, 20£lpngcr burn time, and higher tosses)
would require an additional motor to meet pcifor-
rmnce requirements. The minimum development
of the motor shown represents a lower cost than
adding an additional motor/flight.
UTC 1207 MODIFICATION FOR INTERIM BOOSTER
Y \
Forward Cloturr ,._;. SegnwnttTypI
Case Per UTC 1207 \ Csu Per UTC 1207
Mod TT , ^ :" , Mod Propelbnt
Mod Grain Shape
 r ;•'. .Mod Inhibitors
Mod Propelbnt ; Mod Insulation
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to aiminlmum, consistent
•>V;V*."f •• *'V •'-.' '^H.* '•, , ' 'ihterlnfnaturti Essential .„
 v^., ^
twtc^ Uii*Ui* dianges to the mobile bunchcr%i
requirement for a new gantry, and equipment to •
handle, transport and checkout the SRM booster.
too
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LAUNCH COMPLEX 39
(INTERIM 120" 2 STAGE - HO ORBITER)
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The two-stage 156 in. SRM booster, shown
mated with «n external hydrogen tank orbiter,
requires atotal of three new SRM**. Two of those
form the f it stage white the third motor (UJcn-
tical to the lint stage motors) pcrfornu the
second «age function. • Although a tize advan-
tage fcsccn for the 156 in. SRM relaMve to the
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pouatc fof;lt* l^ hcf "tiqpr** (vs motor) «ost$. Tb«
Mgter *«^e" eotu <kt Ke ftorn the comptiu »truct«uc
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The EPF booster requires four, 260 in. pro-
uul&ton modules in * two-stage arrangement to
boost the HO orbiter. With alt modules identical
to reduce development rcquircmcnts,.lhre« are
used for the first stage and the fourth performs
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The LOX/RP-I pressure fed vehicle carries the
same design characteristics as the N2O4 vehicle • four
modules in a two-stage configuration. A key differ-
ence is the use of Inconel 718 for tank material as
opposed to MY 140 seen on the N204 vehicle. (IIY
140 has unacceptable fracture toughness at LOX
temperatures.)
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! Chinje* to launch Complex 39 for bundl-
ing the EPFS »re due io boosct checkout and th«
need to haudk Urje quantities of boorter pio>
pcnani. (The EPFS requirements for ground
checkout are more costly than those for the solid
motors.) Tho SRM'i on th« other hand require
bigcr handling equipment expenditures than
tnetPFS.
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LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 FACILITY MODS
UOX/RP2STAGE - HO ORBITER)
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?;..;.;."•< - - • . - -S Tbe pressure fed LOX/RP-1 developmental
status.clearly puts it at a disadvantage when com*
pared>n!h the more mature ^0^ vehicle pro-
pulsion system. The increased stage costs for
. the cryogenic vehicle together with this pro-
pulsion system disadvantage make the ^ O^ .
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BLOW -106 Lb 44 4.7
Program $(FMOF -HI Flu) 9S9M 699M
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Initial study baselines for the S-IC were "wet
cradle" conflgurations based on prcvious'analyses
foi internal tanked otbilers. The "wet" cradle
moves -OX forward to provide ample control
authority with standard fins.
tie
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,, An evaluation of the baMlirw (6SK pay load)
vehicle peifomunc* and tiajectory dau showed
that the 50x100 n ml orbit could be achieved with
apptoximately 35 JOOO Ib of unused of biter nccnt
propellant. Utilization of this propellent rctults
in in additional payload capability of 41K for the
H and 49K foi the HO orbiter.
Its
• 3
INTERIM S-IC MAX. CAP ABILITY
1,115.000 Lb LOX
Cradle:89,800 Lb |H CONFIGURATION!




OLOW • 1,164.670 Lb Vstg. 8298 fp»
Payload-114.145 Lb
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Taking advantage;.of tomt of the exceis perform-
ante capability of the S-IC led to the dry cradk con-
figuration shown here. The diy cradle toa sufTiclent
"inch ballast forward to assure boost control. These
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GLOW - 6.038.000 Lb 'OLOW - |,037.0pO Lb , Vstg. 6820 fps
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The interim S-1C program annual costs are
shown to peak at S86.5M In mid FY 1978.
Interim S-IC total program costs ore $471.3M.
This program cost data is based on FMOF
in September 1978 (using S-IC-14) plus 11 addi-
tional production vehicles manufactured at a
rate sufficient to suit the schedule shown.
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Tbli tunumiy ihowj (ha substantial decrease
In the S-IC costs achieved in concurrence with
MSFC since Uie June 1971 baseline. Prime factors
ire the dry cudte, launch, and SE&J co*ts Tor
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Examining cost variations for (ho S-1C DDT&B
raws oibiter conflgutatfon shows them to be rela-



























PROGRAMS S471M 1 S451M









ComjMilsoo of interim booster annual ooU* shows
that funding requirements are minimized through
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Total program cost breakdowns for each
booster ihow tfae S-IC to be lowest because of
substantially lower developmental costs. These
savings hi initial investment offset by a sub-
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tv;. The lowest cost per night of the interim
boosteins considered is the expendable pressure
fed storable. Note that flight cost is inversely
proportional to the initial development invest*
ment. * -
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BOOSTER PLUS ORBITER AVERAGE COST PER LAUNCH


















































. The initial low development costs of the S-IC
to absorb the higher pel launch cosu while i
Mg Us cost advantage for any program less •
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The S-lCs cost advantages, due to its low Ini-
tial investment, nuke it a clear winner for a true
interim program. If the interim program extends,
the S-IC still maintains its cost advantage up to 30
flights. Beyond this number, the alternative boosters
are competitive, although none provide a significant




e "True" Interim • S-IC Clean Winner









. This section of the briefing addresses cost
reduction of concurrent programs.
140
\ ' • •.r'- »'•&'!**•' v •'"' '••%. -•*".-' ^-"'jJT '^•'•v
----^:-&i^>ilt2 . v, %.-'•.. *;M-«ir
.v ^ >vnrv^;-::>:K, ' ^v"v.-> - •^->-^-'-<f^f;p?i
;iii -r-. • . - . - . .'U;--. „ ?. -..'j i^ '- ". tK-/' 'i, • .-'«i'.rJV-.v--j|&i^
t'^'sS '""-^ "' ?*S;?'*-?:'v>
fcl -.'. ";^ -»J> .^ •'fSX^-*-*"
=;-.•/- --Si -z? :.M^^ l^
BRIEFING OUTLINE












2. Which is *bcst'interim Booster for
phased program?




Starling from the baseline H33 space shuttle
(external hydrogen tank orbifc;/heat sink booster)
there we three available courses tot reducing over*
all shuttle program costs.
First we can retain the concurrent program
and reduce peak funding with a delay in the first
manned orbital flight (FMOF). Alternatively we
could delay the space vhuttlc main engine and
proceed with existing Saturn technology using a
J2 engined orbiJer with an F-1-engined RP
booster.
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Secondly we can select a phased interim
program which permits us to meet the scheduled
FMOF for the arbiter with an expendable booster
thereby delaying development of the reusable
booster until we have passed peak orbiier funding
requirements. Thus the interim program is planned
at the outset to become a fully reusable system as
soon as available funding will allow.
Hie third alternative is the extended interim
program. In this program the expendable boosim
would be able to operate economically at lower
traffic rates (100/200 Rights vs 445 flights) and
thus permit a longer delay in phasing the reusable
booster.








Fof the three reusable arbiter/booster con-
current development programs shown, the key
Issues ate: •
• To what extent can peak shuttle funding be
reduced if we maintain basic requirement*
for planned FMOF and the five arbiter/
four booster operational fleet?
• To what extent can peak shuttle funding
be reduced If we changed basic program
requrrfncnts for FMOF, full system
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IWe have updated our basic assumptions to the
MSC cost and schedule groundruU; for the extended
ttudy. The new program milestones (namely phate
C/D go ahead and FMOF) allow four more months for
overall development than those considered in our July
H33 Cost and Schedule Estimate Plan. We have added
another production orbiter and booster to obtain the
stipulated fleet size of five arbiters und four boosters.
No learning has been considered for the manufacture
of reusable flight vehicles. A 90% learning curve was
.used for estimating expendable tank costs. We have
also assumed that no f/ound test hardware will be re-
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Tliere are three ways to reduce peak funding
requirements for a reticle orbiter/bocster con-
current development program. , -
- First, defer the manufacture of production
vehicles not required to meet FMOF past the peak
funding years. Tills requires that the'program be
initially planned and managed from the outset to
meet this cost objective. For example, we would
plan Ip make dual use of key manufacturing
personnel by relocation to support flight test
operations, maintain tooling and equipment,
maintain flight vehicles, etc. Accordingly, we
would also delay material procurement to
meet the production schedule.
Secondly, delay the scheduled FMOF to a
point where « slowdown and corresponding
stretch out in the overall development effnrt will
also reduce peak funding.
Third, plan the initial flights with low cost
vehicle subsystems. Low cost subsystems are
synonomous with reduced systems capability,
such as designing lor a i wo day Ai'U-battcry mis-
sion instead of a seven day fuel-cell mission. Alter-
natively, it could also mean designing with exist-
ing technology and not upgrading at a later date,















Thote are two general oalegoites or available
schedule options, those that maintain the baseline
September 1978-FMOF (Option A) and those that
delay FMOF (Option D-3). "/;...
A further alternative within the baseline FMOF
milestone lies in varying ihc production rate planned
for the three additional orbitcrs (and two additional
boosters) required for operations but not needed for
development flight testing. The choice lies in main-
taining a continuous production line between flight
vehicles 2 and 3 versus a planned production delay'
keyed to the operational capability (OC) milestone.
In the continuous production schedule all major
articles, including the structural and propulsion test
articles, are built on four month centers. In our
baseline Option A schedule, only the development,
ground, and flight test articles are built en fovr
month centers. Fabrication of the third fl'ght
vehicle starts 26 months after the second flight '
vehicle. The remaining vehicles are then built on -
seven month tenters. • ' ~ ^
In Option D-T, Ff-iOF was delayed to the end
of the decade (December 1979). With 15 months
added to the overall development schedule we main-
tained the same requirements for engineering/tooling
information release a? Option A and then stretched
 ;
out the icmaining development activity. As a con-
sequence, the fabrication of major development
articles was extended to 10 month cer.lcrs with 30
months between the 2nd and 3r«i flight vehicles and
S month centers for the subsequent production ve-
hicles. As in the buseline schedule we scheduled





#,-.'-. ' . - • '
•*~_,.-V* 4 • - . - * .
- .:.-• * '/ *.
•a.-- •.<&
H ' '-"* °i.
•:•>,. -r^jC :-• -,-.- •/ -• ..
i : '^^i-'-r^a--'-
•I ••--.• >•!••. .- •-,!«* M£fe3&--.*,-
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The peak funding relationship for the H33
baseline schedule is, flhutrated by this chart. Peak
funding (SI .720)'faun to FY 76. This is attribu-
ted to SI.38B in norwccuning costs fo» develop,
mem of the oibitei, booster and main engine and
$.348 in recurring production. The close relation-
ship bet ween completion of-the two night test ve-
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The fiscal «dvanttge» of keying orbiter/boosU
production to the planned OC milestone are evident
when compared to a program schedule geared to
nuinUin continuous production. Scheduling the 3rd
flight article to meet the September 1979 milestone
for OC will save SI 10M in peak funding.
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One of the methods of reducing peak year fund-
ing is to extend the FMOF date am! ttretch program
oosti ovet a longer time period.
The dotted line on the accompanying chart de-
picts the effect of a 15-month schedule extension to
FMOF. Note that the early year's funding require*
menu are not significantly changed from the baseline
while a reduction of S320M in the peak year is achieved.
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H33 - 15 x 60 EFFECT OF FMOF DELAY
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Lowest H33 funding requirements are obtained '
by combining the FMOF delay with the use of low
cost subsystems on both oibiter and booster. The
net effect lowen the peak funding requirement to
SL19B. A* a consequence of using low cost subsys-
tems the development cost to FMOF is also reduced
to$5.25>fl.
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The team has developed a shuttle program con-
cept which we believe to b* superior to any of the al-
ternatives previously examined. It combines low
peak funding, low cost pet flight when operational,




H J2 ORBITER/R-S-IC BOOSTER
»JJO*fa»
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Early studies of a reusable LOX/RP shuttle
booster concentrated on internally tanked or biters^
with high staging velocity (around 10,000 feet per
second). Use of the RP booster resulted in insuffi-
cient payloads to meet shuttle i equipments. The
hydrogen drop tank otbiter concept which allows
lower staging velocity (around 7,000 feet per second)
and which allows heat sink booster design permitted
the use of the S-IC size and liftoff weight with ade-
quate payloads. This system however did not pro-
vide the target reduction in peak funding. The fur-
ther introduction of a block program approach to
subsystems, selectively deferred or eliminated cer-
..tain DDT&E expenditures to a more acceptable
funding level.
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The low peak funding (SI .098) associated with
this program stems largely from the use of existing.
Saturn engines and the application of a low cch:
Block I/Block 11 subsystem concept. Early Block I
operations are conducted with the four vehicles used
during flight test (i.e., (we arbiters and two boosters).
During FY 75 peak funding, Block I costs (SI .068)
encompass S529M for the orbitcr, S424M for the
boostet, S17M on the J2/F-1 engines and $90M for
flight test preparation and management. Block 11 sub-
systems are introduced in the remaining production
vehicles (three orbiters and two boosters) scheduled
to phase into operation by September 1981.
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CONCURRENT HJ2/R-S-IC
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WhcoTcotnparcd to the baseline 1133 program
fiscal savings»te achievable with the 1U2/R-S-IC pro-
gram both during early build up and the period of
peak funding. The HJ2/R-S-IC program saves S1.16B
















Concurrent HJ2/R-S-IC BLI - II
3Y«arBLIOps
FMOF2$ept81





Croundrules for formulation of the program
were developed to allow a "product improvement"
growth from Block I capability to later full opera-
tional capability, while providing maximum suppres-
sion of peak funding and program cost to reach Block
I FMOF. The gfoundrules minimize dead-end develop-
ments. -
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REUSABLE S-1C BLOCK I BOOSTER CONFIGURATION
GROUND RULES
• Maintain Heat Sink Structure Concept
• Structure Adaptable to Full Block II Mission Capability
Without Change .
• "Concurrent" Development of Orbiter and Booster
• Maximum Utilisation ct Apollo Hardware & Development
Experience (Engines, Propulsion System, Etc.)
• Use F-l and J2 Engines
• Mo Redesign of Distributive Systems for Block II
• H Type Orbiter With Piggyback Mount
• One Month Turnaround
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Developments to be deferred were selected on
the basis -.f significant savings in Block I development
cost while not impacting utility of the Block I system.
The Block I system can cany sufficient traffic to
prove out the basic capabilities of the shuttle system
and provide growth in utility to attain the low cost,
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REUSABLE S-IC BLOCK Ml PROGRAM
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Examination of all potentially reasonable alter-
natives for Block 1 engine* led to Ihe selection of








































Least Cost Growth Risk
Max Use of Available Engines
Eliminates OMS Engine
Requirement
No Afided Block II ROT&E
Cost
No Afi.'ed Block II ROT&E
Cost
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The selected configuration it compatible with
maximum use of existing S-1C stmctute and systems.
It retains S-1C tank volumes and propulsion systems.
The delta wing can be integrated with the S-IC struc-
tural arrangement. In comparison w a hydrogen boos-
ter, its dry weight (553,400 Ib) is 15% greater, but its
size is smaller, with 22% less total wetted area.
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The aerodynamic configuration is stable and
trimmable. Similar to a delta-wing orbiter, it provides
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REUSABLE SIC BOOSTER
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The structural design has been developed in suf-
ficient detail to assure intcgrability with the S-IC, de-
fine r-ijor structural interfaces, and to determine ap-
plicability of recosting S-IC hardware. These designs
have been analyzed for structural loads and heating
histories based on ascent and descent trajectories












J Wing Attach Link YRing















layout and subsystem requirement
studies have been performed on the reusable S-1C con-
figurattan. These studies have verified that use can b«
made directly or with small modification of several
important components taken from the Apollo pro-
gram. The thrust structure will have to be modified
to account for the&.S dcg.cant of the engine and







• F-1 Engines - 100
• LOXTink 100
• RP-ITank 90
• Fwd Skirt . 0
• Intertank °
• Thrust Structure 25
« Fairings & Fin, 0
• Propellant Delivery System 90




• J-2 Engines 100
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Cost differences from the baseline 1133 Booster
were developed In detail, and analyzed by association
with specific changes to ensure understanding and
credibility. These changes included thoso that would
increase costs as well as those that would decrease
costs. As an example, the design and construction of
a forward fuselage to accept the greater number of
airbreathing engines (12 instead of 8) resulted in a
cost increase of SI 2M as shown.
182
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BOOSTER AIR FRAME COST SAVINGS










Reusable S 1C VSH-33
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Program Change Savings
• No Horizontal Stabilizer $ 34.2M
• 12A/BEngineslrwt«3dof8 S-12.2M
o Simpler Thnirt Structure
Because of Fewer Main Engines $ 19.4M
• Simpler Uninsulated RP
Tank instead of LH2 Tank $ 20.2M
• Other $ -6.0M
183
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Tlw direct engineering effort included in the
reusable S-IC program cost estimate is compared
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REUSABLE S-IC BOOSTER DDT&E
TOTAL DIRECT ENGINEERING EFFORT















Design. & Test of 2 Prototype
Airplanes Pius 100 Hours of Flight
Test
To First Launch
Option A to Sept. 1981
Block II FMOF (Sept. 1981)
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Applying the proven Apollo technology engine*
to U» shuttte can cut engine costi in half. A» shown,
the P-l A and J2S engine modifications can be per-
formed at a low funding level over a long pcrtod.
Baric pctformance of the !M A and J2S have already
been demonstrated (Ref. NAS 8-18734 »nd NAS 8-19).
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Approximately equal, and acceptably low cosis
per flight, are demonstrated by the fully operational
H33 (SSME orbitcr and booster) and the 049 Block II
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'3U;."J'-£j. • Y The breakdown oflU2/R-S-lC Block 1 develop-
ment cost to FMO1: shows the result of ujing low cost
vehicle wbsysttins and existing main engines. The -•
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We have concluded on ihe basis of the foregoing
»l the leuubte S 1C Kx'^' »w»<d *** *n
external hydiojjer. tank J2 orhiici i^ K-u able to re-
Uin NASA ihuu'.c piograni :-M!> >««!»»" pribAle
funding llmirationv It puwide* a dcvctopmcnl pio-
jiam *luch »wc:» performance tequircincn
nuximum u»e of Apollu/Satuin c.\jvilcnee ar«J
•vallabk off-tlK-slwIl' ccj*npinent. has no fnajot
dead cnucd devclojwienii and has sif;n»fican:ly
funding and teciiHical ibk than any vonciiireni prtv
ff-jm arvaly/ed to tlsic. In addition the reusable
Block l-ll piopiatu KMilts in kiwei lytal pto|iam
com and operational cost per flight (under ri5M).
197
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REUSABLE S-IC/BLOCK Ml PROGRAM
« Reduces Peak Funding SGOQM (001 &E $3,6358 (Block I)
• Reduces Piojram Risk .
• Makes Maximum Us* of Avgiiabto Hardware
• Eliminates Dead Ended Development
• Reduces Cost ~$1B




There ai« a number of areasin which the Block
Ml approach can be applied to the orbiter to achieve
appreciable saving* (SU9B) iajhie early part of the
program. Several of these (avionicj, power. ACPS)
gain from common usage between the orbiter and
booster.
194
USE OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGY FOR ORBITER
*li








The design definition was utilized in • bottoms-
up cost analysis to determine funding kvel reductions
and cost savings over the comparable H33 (hydrogen
booster) program. Roughly two thirds of the savings
are due to the LOX/RP-1 selection, with the othsr
third attributable to the Block Ml reusable S 1C
program approach.
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REUSABLE S-IC BLOCK I - II SAVINGS OVER H-33 BASELINE
PROGRAM
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In addition \a the seuwWc S-JC approach few
gettutf cust* down (as diwuwd t»<» the jncccUJiw.
page*) <*e cvshwlecl whai couUS bs »chJ#vcd b>>
pulling oui all the uoj» on ic<juir«u«nis i
fw a sty>j&tt*s (h%li preaUi? eivguw'l c
|Moy»m. This chat! d«nwn«ratci a typical
of thh limh«d fa^sabflUy^U »fiyog«nte
» decreased in ti
• Low «»t tubnystciHS arc used
• Abwct-t^otbii capiibiUiy is rc
• FMOf is delayed 1 5 months
Relaxing all of llws« constraint* reduce* peak
Annual fuiidhtg fr uu» tlic ba^line peat of $ I .'.' J5 »a







• Delay FMQF.15 ft/tenths
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This chart compares ihc baseline 1133 program
to a delayed FMOF/low cost subsystem* H33 pro-
gram and to the limited capability NAO-HO/HSB
all cryogenic approach defined on the preceding
FMOF delay combined with low cost sub-
systems reduces the peak S530M and reduces total
program S1.2B. Payload reduction and no-abort-
lo-orblt reduce the peak another S70M and total
program an additional S675M.
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Tb* IU2/R-S-IC program can achieve ihc <amc
(eduction inftw-'jl fundingfromihc IPJ baseline a»
ihc two W co« ui*H,v»!<'nvp!Oi{fani» w»
S-MOr. Tiw UJtYeicncc Iwtween the fc»w cost
ISx^O»»»i! IK) 15x40 NAO programs with «he
lU^/R-S-lC is only SiOONJ. The iU2/R-frlC
ptopam. wfefcSi readies an caf ' i<» |wak 0:V t<»75)
due to iu earlier FMOP, roti«» MIK''* hiuppSkatiun
of'txiiiinK J2/F-1 «»gJn«s lo minimi/e pcsU funding
A^cwdinjity lit aSso Iws tli
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H-» ImfiM {ODTM; n fHOf l/» • MM)
Ml) nfth l*« Cat Sutsn M2/n • U9I)
lira C»»rtiWt with Uw t»«« S«*t»» IIJOT • Ulli







Our SJudiei have shown Out the best way to
minimi/? 1133 baseline funding tcquircincnt* (fur
!*pt 78 FMOl'), U mktfy the product >on whuk-»
to I he planned OC mUcJIonc. Ih addition, v-c liivc
ihawniha! ih« Omrf^gfeflujrcuKBts^jt ihc bu»«r- .
line 11.^ 1' cunciiir^ ni ^fOgjoni(Si.7~B) «:iin he re» *.
dumt by another SfOO^OOM* A i:diiction of I Ins'
magnitude ncL'cswlatcxa chatijji- in shuSilc
fcquircmciitl and gioundiolcs," This cati be
plisltcd •» two \\ay»: HiSl by using low COM sub-
systems wiili a delay in FMOivtiu! sttoiu!. by
using cxtstui" Saturn engine! The con»binc«i
effect of delayed-I'MOF and using kwcr cost
(limited capability) iubsystetm will achieve ihc
« Ifxr 1133 baseline (I SxMV6*Kk
If v& KU u* a ttsuitcvt capabiliiy d«lgr. with •
smaller jnd lighter paykwd (13x40/45K) plus:
no abort to-orhiit Capability, the overall
'be nsuuced farthA-r. Thediffcicivx in it.(,tl
costs bi-twven the 15x4U NAO-IIO ancf IU3
OSxAO) i* only S675M afd $7UM in ptuk fu«wli«ev'-V-
The.HJi/R-S-IC puigram U$c8exJ«tng.Jj/l I ;;
cngi«tcs coupfcU with Block HI «ubjyilenis to
achk've an <-4»all\ lo\v funding icquircnttnt. By
cxclfding the dcvclup.iifiU of a new shuttl? ;i>uin
engine, the 1IJ2/R-S-IC is able to piovidc full sy;icn»
capability (l.'v^dO/oSK), lowest pc-.k funding, and
lowest devcl'ipmcnt cost la Sept 78 FMOl-'.
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CONCURRENT PROGRAM CONCLUSIONS
Key Production Vehicles to Planned 0 C
To Reduce B-33 Basefine Funding
- Delay FMOF
- Use Low Cost Subsystems
Limited Capability (15 X 40 NAO-HO)vs H-33 (15 X 60) Savings
- With Common Subsys. S675M Total Prog. S7QM Peak Funding
- With low Cost Subsys Duly NAO. S1862M Total Prog. S280M PAF
$1.1 - i .26 Peak Funding Achievable Two Ways
- H-33 or Limit Capability with Low Cost Subsys/FMOF Delay
- KI2/RS-IC (Sept 78 FMOF)
HJ2jRS4CProvides Full System Capsbtlrty At Lowest Peak




















2. Which is "best'interim Booster for
phased program?
3. Mow can we reduce overall Shuttle
program costs?
207
For the three phased program configurations
shown, the key issues are:
• What b the required interim operational
period to minimize peak annual funding?
'*.'"
• How can peak shuttle funding be reduced
if we change basic program requirements
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The phased program groundrules shown con-
form to those established by the NASA/MSC Cost
Analysis Branch on July 12,1971 and forwarded
to the Phase B study extension contractors.
"•> . "-T4- I1-"-."
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PHASED PROGRAM GROUND RULES
• Oibrter
- ATP April 72
-FHFMay77
- FMOF Sept 73
- 5 Flight Articles
• Interim Booster
- Option A- 0 Flights
- Option B • 9 Flights Sept 78 - May 81
- Option C -12 Flights Sept 78 - May 82
• REUSABLE BOOSTER
- Option A • FMOF Sept 78 • OC Sept 79
- Option B • FMOF Sept 81 - OC Sept 82
- Option C • FMOF Sept 82 • OC Sept 83
- 4 Flight Articles
211
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In addiiion to the NASA phased program
groundrulet. the follow ing additional groundrules
wfic established by Ciumman/lJocing and included
in all phased program costs:
• Reusable Booster Sustaining - An annual
cost beginning with program award and
continuing until reusable booster ODT&E
build-up. It com* the cost of such itcim
as monitoring orhitct progress and assuring
oibitcr/boostei interface maintenance
Orbitci Conversion • Covers the additional
cost of convening orbiters used in the
interim program to operational program
configuration
Added Wind Tunnel - Cost arising from
additional wind tunnel testing in the interim
flight configuration
Orbit cr Flight Control • Additional avionic
hardware/software required to control the





INTERIM PROGRAM COSTING ASSUMPTIONS
e Reusable Booster Sustaining. S35S/I Ea«* Year of Deb*
• Orbher Conversion Interim/Reusabh Booster. S50M
o Added Wind Tunnel Separation Tests. S10M
e Orbrter Flight Control Avionic/lnterim Booster loterfaei. $581!
213
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With postpone .IK: i-i =. ' tr,'.sabls booster develop-
ment, much of the technoktgical risk involved is re-
moved. Technciugkal problem sotutkws achieved
during orbitei program development wiil be adapted
to the booster during its initial design phases; rather
than during advanced design where technology change!
impose redesign requirements. Booster devetopment
will be undertaken during a period when the orbiter
is fully developed with the rnajoi pott ion of the
booster development occurring after the orbiter has
begun horizontal flight testing. Due to the low
flight rate during the interim program, the two
oibiters procured during the test phase are adequate
for the interim flight program. Additional orbiter
production may therefore be delayed to control






Intcrim booster development, procurement, and
operations costs are a very small part of annual pro-
gram funuing. However, they allow sufficient delay
in starting the reusable booster program to keep
annual funding to approximately the SI.OB level de-
sired. In addition DDT&Ii remains below the SSB
level tluough FMOF.
The high interim flight cost is due mainly to
the limited learning attendant with the short interim
booster production and operation. The low flight
rate defined for interim program (3 flights/year)
results in largely sustaining operations manpower
costs. However the low total number of bunches
in the interim program adds only <¥7o in nonrecurring
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H-33 (15 x 60)/S-IC .-» MSB PHASED INTERIM PROGRAM
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' The lower costs for the United capability phavxl >
interim program is achieved through the reduction in
orbitcr size stemming from ictaxed aboit requirements
and low cost subsystems. These cost redactions occur
early in the development cycle anJ are prirrcrfy re- •
sponsibtc for the reduction in cost to FMOF and force
the peak funding yerr to 1€>SO. In this phased pro-
gram, the effect of the reduced arbiter si/ir on ic-
ductions in booster sue and cost coupLtS -.vith re<I;xed
ofbiler operations costs are the major contributor
to reduced {icak funding in 1980.
218
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LIMITED CAPABILITY PHASED INTERIM PROGRAM
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Another alternative directed at maximum re-
duction of early development ousts involves use of
existing Apollo-developed haidw»ie. Through use of
J2 and F-) engines, S-IC ayo tankige in ihe booster
and low cost subsystems as previously described, peak
funding can be reduced to SI.09B. By phasing Ihe
HJ2/R-S-IC program with an interim S-IC for a four
year period, peak annual funding requirements can
be further icduced to below S900M and DDT&E to
FMOF can be reduced to S6.25R. This represents
a substantial reduction in funding lequiiements in
Ihc early years of the shuttle development program.
22O
HJ2/S-IC - R-SUIC PHASED 4 YEARS INTERIM PROGRAM
f » J ?o» « i M K M T a
rg-r».' f v' .?&! .grgmrr-rl
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Comparison of phased intciim programs shows
the substantial reductions thai can be achieved with
the full capability IU2/S-IC R-S-IC approach in
cost to FMOF, peak annual funding and early funding
requirements. The IU2/S-IC R-S-IC full cap-
ability program is competitive from a cost stand-
point with the limited capability NAO-NO/SIC
IISB program.
722
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Our studies have indicated tiut thr'uigh pro-
gram phasing, several conHguia'iuiuI approaches can
achieve NASA's desired goalsot SI.OB peak annual
funding and SS.OB lor development costs to FMOF.
To achieve minimum peak funding, botli a lour-to
five-year interim operational period and orbiter pro-
duction phased to support the reusable booster
operation arc required. Those items are necessary
to afford sufficient univuplint; of the oibitcr and
reusabk booster peak funding icquircinruis.
Further extensions ol the interim program
beyond five years will incicaso interim pi
costs and hare no further effect on peak funding
since the orbitcr and booster are lully uncoupled
and the peak funding requirements are being driven
by the individual orbiter and booster funding re*
quircments. With the addition of low cost subsys-
tems in the initial operational pha*e nnd extensive
isc of presently devek>pcd hzrdvue. peak funding
can b« furtliei rc-.lu«d to b^low S900M. The
IU2/S-1C ^R.S-IC eonihincs sll tbeie funding
advantages and ^ hkvci the towtst pc Jt funding




CONCLUSIONS, PHASED INTERIM PROGRAM
• 4-5 Yean Interim Operation Required for Minimum PAF
e 0.85 to I.OB PAF Achievable
• HJ2/SIC-R S 1C Lowest PAF & DOT&E to FMOF
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The "extended interim" program represents
a possible alternative to either the concurrent or
phased interim programs. This appioach addresses
the case in which lower traffic rates are anticipated
over an extended Jimc pciiod. Higher cost per
flight is balanced by the c.irty savings accruing
ftum extended deferral of fully reusable booster
development.
Three candidate configurations, each
utili/Jng external HO tanks and an expendable
boorier. have been evaluated:
Thrust Augmented HO • Km ploys twin
156-in. loliJ roclcts burning in parallel
with three whiter-mounted high pressure
engines
• Pressure Fed Storablc - Utilizes a two
..stage N204/UDN1H booster burning in
series with a thrce-engined orbiter
• Two-Stage Solid - Uses a total of seven,
7-segmenl solid rockets burning in a 5-2
sequence. Orbiter characteristics are
identical to those of the pressure fed
storable configuration
AD orbilcr configurations are sized to ac-
commodate 15-foot diameter by 60-foot lung
paytoad dimensions.
This facet of the ASSC study extension
effort is directed toward the determination of the
best configuration for the extended interim applica-
tion in terms of lowest cost, lowest technical risk,
and most acceptable operational characteristics.
726
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EXTEMDED INTERIM PROGRAMS
Lower Traffic Rate 100/200
Peak Funuing ~ SIB
Medium Cost/Flight
Phased Into HSB
Thrust Augmented HO (TAHO)






The thrust augmented HO configuration com-
prises a three-engined delta-wing orbiter. a hclly-
mounteJ external HO tank sized for orbiter burn
from liftoff to injection, and two fixed-noz/le,
156-in. diameter solid rocket motors side-mounted
to the HO tanks. Orbiter engines and the SRM's
are burned in parallel up to SRM burnout/jettison
at 5J68 fps. Orbiter engine burn continues through
injection. Control during boost is provided by
orbiter engine thrust vector control.
The bulk of the orbiler liftoff weight of 1.73M
Ib is attributable to the 1.41M Ib of main injection
propcllanl required for burn from liftoff to orbiter
injection. Lightweight HO lank design is acheived
on this configuration by pickup of SRM thrust loads
and 1X>2 lank drag loads rtt the orbiter forward
attachment point, thus reducing the axial loads
sustained by !he aft-located external LH-, tank.
Downstream introduction of a tandem-mounted
heat sink booster would require external tank
redesign to accommodate introduction of axial
loads at the tank aft end.
DDT&E and total cost to first manned
orbital flight are S3860M and $43IOM, respec-
tively. Peak annual funding required during
development is S974M. Total program costs












The pressure fed storable configuration utilizes
a 1.13M Ib external HO tank orbiler plus a Iwc-siajie
expendable liquid r»>ckct booster consisting of four
identical tankage/engine modules. The three out-
board booster modules, clustered at 120 deg intervals
around the core module, comprise the booster first
stage. The core module provides second-stage thrust
and also serves to transmit both firs) and second
stage thrust loads to the external HO tank via a
conical interstage skirt. First and second stage
burnout occurs at 2875 and 6200 fps. respectively.
Control during boost is provided by liquid injection
thrust vectoring of the booster engines.
Orbitcr main propulsion consists of three
higlhprcssure LOyl I''7 engines each providing
483,000 ib vacuum thrust. Booster engines
uliti/e N->Oj/UDMM pressure fed propeUant.
Sea level'thrust rating of each engine is 2.4M Ib.
All-up weight of the stacked configuration is
5.S6M Ib.
DDT&b and tola! cost to first manned
orbital flight are S4060M sr'i S5 IOOM. respec-
tively, with peak funding iotaling slightly over
SIB. Total cost for I(XJ and 44S High! pro-











Tlie "tv/o-stage solid" configuration employs a
1.13M Ib external HO tank oibiter (identical to that
used in the pressure-fed storable configuration) plus
a two-stage solid rocket booster comprising seven,
J20-in. diameter SRM's in a 5/2 configuration. The
frve-engincd fust static cluster is tandem-mounted to
the external HO tank: thrust loads are transmitted to
the lank via a conical "erstage skirt.
The second-stage SRM's are installed sym-
metrically on each side of the external tank in the
plane passing through the lank centerline. Mov-
able nozzles are incoiporatcd on all SRM's to
provide thrust vector contiol during the Kx»t
phase. First and second stage br.rnout vela-
cities arc 1952 arid 6I7X ips respectively.
Lift-off weight of the configuration is 6.04M Ib.
ODT&E and twial cost to FMOF a::
S4000M and S4910M. ,v;th peak funding lotJ-
ing S995M. Cost per %!,:. on A three flight
pei year basis U $41 .KM. Total cost* for 100
and 44.. flight propanw aic S7.7B and
respectively.
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2 - STAGE SOLID
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Basic configuration chaiacteristics and costs are
summarized in the table opposite. Significant points
are:
• All orbiters are sized for the same payload
volume; expcnd^bL- boosters for llic PFS
and the two-stage SRM are sized for 45K
payloads rather ilun 65K
• TAHO external lank dry weight constitutes
a higher percentage of total (core and
tank) dry weight as a consequence of
the parallel bum approach
The twin fixed-nozzle SRM's utilized in
the TAHO configuration represent the
simplest booster configuration of the
three alternates considered
TAHO costs arc lower than those of the
PFS or two-stage SRM configurations,
particularly in the area of cost per
flight (lower by 22% and 36% respec-
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I. . J ^1 »»J.I ii UI
The chart opposite reflects a comparative eval-
uation of the thirc candidates for an "extended
interim" program in tcrins of program costs and
key performance/operational parameters. Where
one configuration exhibits a cleat advantage in a
given evaluation category, the appropriate para-
nwter has been "boxed".
Although all candidates represent tech-
nically feasible approaches, it is concluded that
the thrust augmented HO configuration affords
the best selection on the basis of cost, technical
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RERRQDUCIBILITY OP THE ORIGINAL PAGE IS-POOR.
ot the *• '•'' 4- I l'J
1-nr.l I he i ;'.citon »>! V .,_„, > • 7inK» Vps by
th-.- v;
N-.'\! t!i>; I1"1/ '"'•"' i'>>!ili. .tu>>i. i-'i-u i«-)^. i
clv.K!"..'. -I b> ll.> "v i-'l t:..-Jk-" i . ..'I'l \v , i tc»>. b;
nb-.uiv a LOX : •!>:. tt.r\iji.J in ti.v .;:IM>J, i:nck. i.i-.
ilu- ».ni>uh Cj; l'o:v . «.: iai o lou/h U> r^-re:.n. >-.ill.i;>
tli.- S U' engine ,'i.v.''.*! c«>;i!u'I vu;n:b:!it; . i !.•» iir-
v;.|%.-,l .1 iclalivclj i mpK- j?!op-.i!.t..-.s :<vd syiicm
i,j,,.l:!i,:>l>un. Ivi iuvctllwL'v. - r. '•Uir.cui-j;...
I inally the "••vet aathc" kis b-.-cn sup.via
Ir, !V "•!• . f: iv"e" ; npniL'-h v.J.tt-h. >••.. f u r t h e r l.ikiug
.iiiva'tUv'.' «'! t l iC iixi.Mv.'d j •i.iotnuiii'i' trcirfiti, gets
:',i«; .gv.:i!»u > K i: nih.i! v.ip.:i';!it> i iNiug fiM.il hal-
L-il ;toru!v-to) .!• I'.K- cra-.'.k.
Tim Mmplit ioi icMi o>.:ji!cd >'• .i
c\'«,? icduci'iuns tU'-if 'sy \j>.iw the S-SC' K- bo >.!ii- i«s
Since the «.csl pci flight ol aiit:xpci:cl.t!)lc in-
t.:iiu S-IC is ) > - . - l i . '"• i.> on'y ju-i cfl ' . 'Ct;%c i: p'-. vl
.-•jt -jttiT tc'u',r.>--. Uv/ (.ijipri'M'iiuU-'.Y t?) P..;;.. Is.
(in tlic uthc. !'/:.il. i'j k--vi> ;v.ik ij.inuai iuni!.' -'
t'.!.w:: v\v r<v<>!ii;ii..>!J ui-bym.; HSU !::i:i!i:i>:
') i-l U>ui ;. -.us.
iniei;!rcbo.'ii..f fuiu'ii.t; r.,: :.'i




REPRODUCIBILITY OF THE^ORIGINAL PAGES POOR:
' * '
P;!AStDH-c3/S-!C -• KSB ,i <•
PHASE I
• UJ:»TI- | of. Pa* S 'l.-m Sooti'
• Contrutri'-Or. n;» Oitittrf






- _ - ;
Crit'ff ". ? (" .'/v: jJ : » 3 .' :
— ~
i / ,
c v j ~ .•> ?-~*. *>*\ ' !T r / CT^3T'6 i_'jLi_'t:L-_tl 1-^ -- ^ J-4 - -^ i-^  n
, v.rv'r^""rrj-'.'T7^r'irrTsT',-o • »a>> syrarTKiTin .8s*2- l
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Rediiciion of Vv </v us ?i-\ j<t f|>, Sv I!,-.' !v.:.Jiii-
iisg nJ" t-xU'inul taut. oibiKT:. \ . :^ 11. -.Hi •'.•>: S-K' ;vr-
fni ;.•..:<•:..• nv.'.ipin su i i i c ie i t t ly ;^: -• !u'a: stnK t\:ily ii--
usui'l. S-IC booslfi to bo coiiMOt-'i-.-J. I he K-vt';i 'ie
sliuuu- iVStcin niecis all cf Ihc baNic »!tuu!o ubj-xiives
( fu l l if ii-jbiliiy, lov, cos; p«.-i ii!.y.i. -:s'iy
with a cot:curr?ut jvojiiain wh>cii l:a< u ^'
n-il'ji f<J peak 3niiu.it funiimg r..\iuircmoi!i (Si .OxMJ vs
Sl . /m foi tlie baseline sysitm).
1 his has Ixvii ;iciiiv'v-jd hy ireikiii;.* etlective use
of AjM')!1!-' Satuni L jhn:i.'u^y !":.'>:);•!> u'j.-'nijj-ijnp lit -
vok»;:iii».%iii i)i"a new fcjt/jii'r i>f.''p'..!>.L-i: v,'-:!ein.
t!ifi-..^i; :»sc c-f the J2 ci*;;i..c in i!..' o i l > i l , r . ai:J
ih.-i- ' ' lit ini i i . i !«,- . - i -r i - iw vo5t |H' >«.•': Osubiys-
tt:!!.\ :ii •!:] veli:\.!:r? fro-. > * • : > • < > -'in c.'K'.'i: :ovei to
opcrjtawJAy m>»'f <.Li";ib!.- /B.:'->c.k i'; :-iti>*yMcit)
fcatu;.-.;. «.:;icc tlw j.-.v!. funti-ric r.-.;-. "^ ,:..-i:t i;ai
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REPRODUGBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL J>AGE IS POOR.
CONCURRENT I ',*'?. CHCSTER/R-S-iC BOOSTER
^ " O r»*ta..v, CjiicS-yl.U Obj'.e
I '- \ **. - 2Sr»,;
-lo» Curt f'irht
•'• ' /& i ^u j ? / _ j _/tiJ_>SJ •<-__-i_L«-> J_f-> .' i.: ; oi> !




Phastnp an interim fxrvndabK: "dry cradie"
S-!C (approximately 12 fiW-.ti) wim a fully reusable
"\vip.ucd" S-IC lakes nu.ximinx advjnfape oi c:\istiui'.
Apollo/Saturn technology. Ky ctnnbrisint: f l i c basic
fiMtutes of Ihc two piograisii Described oi> ;hc im-
mvdi.iteiy preceding [x:gc-s. iiic !.3v.v*.r p»»<sjb!e peak
ansiual fundinii is udiievod. ut! iuaic .'•iiu:ii;- objec-
tives arc nut. and an opcratiuna! cc«st p.-i i'lij:Iit com-
petitive with ihc baseline s_. st^ni is icali^cc}.
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The t lnus ! augmented external HO iank '
(TAIIO) syst.-ni is a .-Ivrivntiv-.: of the A.>A parallel
burn ''sUice-aiHi-a-hul!" conf; ".-.ration of the- oiiginal
ASSC -.liiuy. !: foturei si;:y!,-. :if^p-o:i. fixed coz-
y.lc 156-in. SRM'i. an SSME j.-uv-.vicd oibiU'» ami a
l;i!:v i-xi-.-tiia! i!O lank. The "JATO b«josier" simpii-
cii\ ' of tin's f/sl.cm icsul;-. in l.rv; peal: fu.'iJi::j' <e-
qL'i;cin;:.i-< io I:MO!- (ap'piu.xioia'.cly SIB) t ':)Ci
ir.cciu:ii ci;s!\ pci ili^li! ^!s2t>.fiM average fot" t!ie first
\1 H^'Jiis ::::d >10.6M avvraje f«n -i-V.S iliglils). Throe
(!.) .C;R>! .-.xi'-.;;) .i p:odi:cis-',i hfiofi': I?.) the (';o;>pinc
oi :t p:;if oi S!'\! ctses or: cacli f! ;<ht. and (3) in^isl-
fici;ml' . low iMs;/fijr=!i! Io <::•;•:lire all puicmi;-1 si iut-
o'-vfconic by >t.;i:ip.!-. up a pijs'iod reuiabli1 bo-j.-.icr and
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G PAOT BLANK NOT nun:
liy plo'.'i'i-: cos; ;iv; ilL-hi v; U'Ui! o'>>! lu FV'Pi",
th. various p:u;:Kii-.i al ternatives c:iii be ic.iJHy asje<; cJ
K-l.-tr.e 10 onu ai ; ->ih . - i .
All v,f tile i-i--i".-'.i i i i ict i i i i ptovu^in coil tc&ul;-.
arc i-.i^uivd ;il 2 ••. ia'.ixcly !iir.!i cost jx-t i \ - ± l i i ant!
tluicfore f l ic i:--'- ••:! 3;i in ter im bousU'i ifioukl be
!'.c!ci lio-.vn t" .:s !••••'• :ii possible while mi-oiinj.ll'.t
obi.'cci*c n!\k~i.!> •)!• .-.-ti-viblc boosk-r devclupi.'ic-ii!
ffinJj^g. V.V bo!:.••.•.• :!>.:t 12 nij.i!ij jl n r:<tc of :ijjprn\-
ir.U!ic!v !)I/L-.- !);!•;(! - jw; >ea: v/ouJii hn- .sulficicni.
All of ii:o c.\!vr.Jccl i i U C i i i - i pf<.- ; :Ki i : is hyvc intcr-
|]v:i::3!'- nx!^ ; .: i:;;.i;: will: liic T A i ! C > -••lov-'ing th?
lit.'.cst i»vi'ra :i' vk=. , ! ti- K'.iOP. Lvcn :ti t i ic c.\ t i i- i i ic u(
•l-1*> flights, i!ic cx'.cjuJcd interim programs arc not
sii'Ticicnlly coni[>c»irjvc to captuic all potential
The co'.icuricut baseline H35 program has tli?
t!i.*siicd low cost PIT flight but is expensive in cost to
l-'MO!:. Delay of I:MOH drive* peak funding down but
uiKieiXtandab/y makes l i t t le diffci?ncc in total cost
to I-MOF.
The IIJ2/R-S-IC (RI'-I) concurrent
with a cost p'.-r fli^.it competitive with the baseline
nnd a sij;i)ific.;i)t savirj; to I-.%JOH (v, ithout ilehyiug
FMOF) is clearly the best appiouch to meeting tlu

























Total Cosi to Fi'.lOF SM
c
This summaiy comparison chart is provided
for icaily rcfeience iy t i r e probities, of the vehicles
liiscus^cd in the pr-.-seiiijlion.
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'"•rF,~»nsv: PAG;- BLANK NOT PILMrv
The HO or'vu-i .:pp;oac!t li-M'.fcrs struct l i t . :)
complexity 1'iom the v hic'e to ii:c I . I M K and uir.k/
b:.!.>ster intcihice. 'I lie liO cost pi:i t l i j h t exceeds
thai "f ji: II oibi:c:. ai=d it nu\\ ap;v.i!< that the
production cost nf SP HO lank/ in ter^ i i t jc s t ruc ture
will excc'.'d tha t ui tw-,i II tanks. Additional time
v.'ili be required to mure nccurate!> d.-tlne tiie I I/HO
relationship.
Low cost inteiiin subsystems show peak fund-
ing advantages in a.M programs. The I'.lork I/Block II
subsystem approach is strongly ai!vu;:ated foi the
shut t le system finaUy selected.
Conibinini! iho orbiter rfijuiri-'n.'ents reductions
which have been coi:sideied (nayioi . i .''>ay diameter
aiu! lengtii, payload weight, nuuboi t - io-orbi l (NAO)
;-.nd siibstiluiion of JJ cnjrincs) ri:«n:-:s i l ic baseline
proj'.rajn peak luiiiiiP.g approximately S200M









- Harder To ttal.tnce
« HO Tank Development more Complex
o HO Cost Per Fliy.'rf iSigher than H
«> Choice of H vs NO Wot Clesr Cm Yet
_ Needs Concentration For Nnxt Two Monllis
o Low Cost Subsystems will s?vc Early Dollars
- Include in Seicji.lcu Orbitcr
o Combining a!) fjri'ittr Rcquiren-.sint Reductions
(15X40. NAP. .12}
- Saves Total Fre:,.'^  SLOB
e:-.:-;--- S200M
Thrcr a l i r ina t ive p:«»i-.i.mi apiJioachcs ha\f been
evTilmicd relat ive ID thi- MI!!;.-reusable ci"it.-U!re:tI
1133 baseline program.
The concuirent Sj tutn technology pingnnn ic-
tain* the ba^ic sisuiile \\ ^:c-.n goal ot' t'uU u-u.vjhiliiy
wltile achieviii};>ub»tan:!.!l »\»st reduetions iclalixv
to the baseline.
The S'jtun1 S iC !> .-i.-jily ;he best phased
inteii in l « < > ' » . < i e i - li eiiM-.u1 - i-< b«.x><i<T itex'-'ic-jMiKTit
permits full con.-enirution en iii '.Mii-r developnicnt.
Us IK-.- il-.ould \>c \ \n\ \ i - \ \ to 3p;-n»':i;jtely 12
The best :>f ihe extended interim
'•s the paralicl burn, t h i u ^ t aujincnti-il IIP (T.AMO)
i';'.'\:i.im wltioii i:-i-\ txvo ! St> in. fixed nvw/Je.
•>o!id roi'koi n^'U-rs ioi buoit avii^!. Due u» ni:
in<utTui.xntly l t .»v i nst p..-( night : : I l ic upeiatii>;ui!
ri':::;o, event u^l i><i. t i :ng 10 a !: bc-o>';-r ii
•s
REPRdDUCIBlLITY OF THE ORIGINAL PAGE ,IS POOR. |
I
s-
lir.u r,i7fr.fi.u: r."., ar.flv.PArtsuii;;.:fir.ANfLV Riouct COSTS
ovtp. juu r.oNCUi .IN; ;v;r.GRf,:.-. , --
(1) CfliKa.-r^oj. HJ.; r 5 1C
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v .S75 Pcik ( i




Tn complete oi.r px-sei ' iaiUm we hr.ielly wj:!i
ID .i;l.i:»--.s the K\\MViir..>ii>!:i',i.>i"- \'-e v\-•.:!•! in:iki- TI
l l i . r li'.Ou of the j> ..•,111.1:1 SANA ii I 'JCKI- ' . Ill v:o\ o!
the forituoinm.. i-tti!:;et JIYIMI •[»•;. ihe wy u-.il ii-c.i!
l i m i t a t i o n . .i.nJ the tj.--i:ahi!:l> *•) ' l e l . ' i i ' . i s i j : i!c.-:i!on
llcxi ' ' i ! i ty d i< \ \ns t i e : i t ! i i'i |l:r prosuan: v.i' would
nv;?!:."i-:;l ilu! yuu t:=ki' i!;^ !f>l!c,v.-:->?- Hi^-c su-ps
now:
Move iKi\v on liif external t ank orbi ter
v.-ith J2 t -n f i i - -
Complou- i l < c I iC)sy ; ' . c in cvn' i iai ion dur ing
(lie next two iii ' - .p.t i .- . ?ii t l u i t a Jceision bv-
twocn M ;inJ !i(! •-.•n be nv.uii- up. > i , i t a ol
eo;rip;ir:'.b!e m:'!' ii ' .y. \\V h.-lp.-vc rfiis to
be entirely ef::-:st-.-i!t v.-i!!i your p j i> . -u re -
incnt schfih--! •
i u' t i i - . - i n i e i i t i i I '• ' ' !x llOt
l ime e t i i i w i i l . llow.-v, i , i . : -.liiii; .1! • • ' ' • • ' ' : ' i > > K - N
Si-ieilii.'!! ih i le-NJunl t 1 . i lu: S-1C is e!<•."' '• :l'1' >'l'il
clwiei- !\>r a pli.»M\l ui iei 'n:- . pi.'Ci.!:!' !'• ""':•'•'," '•<-'
12 I'Vst'liis. "I he selert!•••!-, , > ! " t h i s . i j - n - - ' «:' ' ' id pf l )-
xid'.' t l;e inin.:ni.!!i. p. -oV. h»o>.u-i <' • ' • • ' 'K'n!
lisk thus pormittint! ni: t \ i i r iUin con. ••ni'-"''"" '-'^)
oihittn Jevelop-'icnt.
Tl.iiJ:
Because the.- n-iivibie il-.'M1".' S •'""• '!""'-"J
syitcrn ol'tVrs the very re-.:! possibi-iy "' '• !:'ili'"';"
aconcuiTeni >li-.it '.K- pio?ir!::i \ ' . - i s i i : : r •; : . : ' iM!i '- :?K.iy
S I B p o j k fii'.!iiiru-:ii!,!.:;S t in- -;;iir. • : :•• i<-".'!:ir. in
a low cost per i l i r ' i i . v..- PH-J-.O-;-.' ..:• " • • • •• iX -'
cvalu;Uii>!i of the K-S-lL" in: the IK--.I I- " '" -"!''>•
This coin!jinjiiij:i of M.:p-, '• • • • • • ' • ' • ' "• : '
mits !'!(• i iMt i . s t ion r.f the orb ;•-•: •.! • •' •' ' ' ! t l •''•'
i-'.v.>n ii^ p;:i^'.'.-;:! > \ ' i i h i n I |KS ,::-S'.HU •• ' '• • '•'•'•'••'•
tiilloai ::nu kcen.N open ii!1- v'.piioi. ••' • • • ! '•• '
.^P..». «K^/-: .^ . ,- - ,^-.. ' - f- •v- • ' » • • -
